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Abstract 
  
The prevalence of corporate social responsibility has been continually increasing 
over recent years. The debate of whether a business should act in a manner that furthers 
societal needs or if they should simply focus their efforts on maximizing shareholder 
value is of popular interest since it affects the fundamental structures of how a business 
will operate. One of the major influencing theories in favor of social responsibility is the 
stakeholder theory. The opposing viewpoint is the shareholder theory, which highlights 
that the sole responsibility for a corporation is to act in a way that maximizes profits.  
This thesis will outline the stakeholder and shareholder theories to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the debate and then offer a critical and philosophical 
analysis of shareholder theory to ultimately argue why the moral significance of a 
promise better promotes maximizing shareholder value. 
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Introduction 
 The topic of corporate social responsibility has been a longstanding concept in 
business. A business’s concern for engaging in public service is always a central theme in 
developing a business structure.  It is only in recent years, however, that the debate over 
the nature and extent to which business act socially responsible has become more 
complex and increasingly popular.  On one side of the debate are those in favor of 
corporations acting socially responsible due to the moral responsibilities corporations 
hold for society; the other side of the debate advocates maximizing shareholder value, 
due to the responsibility the CEO’s bear to the investors of a company.   
 
I. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility 
Before continuing, it is essential to understand what social responsibility actually 
is.  In this context, for a business to be considered socially responsible it should be 
thought of as having a social conscience in providing the public with opportunities that 
will further society.  A widely accepted definition of CSR is: 
“To be socially responsible... then means that profitability and obedience to the 
law are foremost conditions to discussing the firm’s ethics and the extent to which 
it supports the society in which it exists with contributions of money, time and 
talent. Thus, CSR is composed of four parts: economic, legal, ethical and 
voluntary or philanthropic.”i 
It is important to note that CSR can be distinguished in two types of actions.  One type of 
CSR engages in acts external to the company.  Such acts are typically more publicly 
noted and can include donating to charities, taking action to reduce pollution, or finding 
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measures to eliminate discrimination; on the other hand, there are acts that are still 
considered moral or charitable but relate to the business.  For example, paying higher 
wages to the employees of a company than is required if the company feels that 
employees deserve more than what is minimally required.  Noting such a distinction 
simply helps to understand what makes up corporate social responsibility.  In general, for 
a business to engage in corporate social responsibility would mean that they are 
responsible in utilizing their power to engage in acts that work towards helping society.   
 
 The first chapter explores the two major sides of the debate, stakeholder theory 
and shareholder theory.  While each side holds important value, I will focus primarily on 
shareholder theory for the ensuing chapters.  Initially presented by economist Milton 
Friedman, the shareholder theory aims to maximize profits for a company while staying 
within the legal and moral bounds of society.  In other words, shareholder theory does not 
advocate for social responsibility.  One of the significant arguments advocating for 
shareholder theory focuses on the moral significance of a promise and the relationship 
between a CEO and shareholders.  By gaining a thorough understanding of the 
promissory argument including its weaknesses and criticisms, I have created an argument 
that combines Utilitarian1 and Kantian ideas to favor the promissory argument, and thus 
Friedman’s ideas of maximizing corporate profits. 
 
 
1 Utilitarianism is one of the classical ethical theories presented in philosophy originally developed by John Stuart Mill. 
The theory of Utilitarianism is based off of the ‘greatest happiness principle’ which states that actions are right if they 
tend to promote happiness and wrong if they produce the opposite. In general, Utilitarianism seeks to promote overall 
welfare in order to achieve a greater level of happiness in society.  
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Chapter 1 
The Central Debate 
 
 The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is deeply rooted in business 
ethics philosophy due to the interesting ethical dilemmas it presents. On one side, should 
a corporation attempt to fix societal problems and/or work to further good on an internal 
level? On the other side, should a business merely aim to maximize shareholder wealth? 
Both sides of the CSR debate present strong arguments and strong defenses. This chapter 
explores the prominent philosophical arguments in the CSR debate in order to give an 
essential overview of the major viewpoints. The chapter will lay out ideas concerning 
Milton Friedman and the shareholder theory, criticisms of the shareholder theory 
presented by Christopher Stone, and R. Edward Freeman who objects shareholder theory 
by presenting the stakeholder theory. 
 
I. Milton Friedman and the Shareholder Theory 
In the 1970’s, well-known economist Milton Friedman published a piece entitled, 
“The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits”. In this paper, Friedman 
argues in favor of what is called shareholder theory. Advocates of the shareholder theory 
propose that corporations should seek to maximize profits for their business so long as it 
occurs within legal and moral boundaries. Friedman’s paper questions what it means for a 
business to act socially responsible and ultimately argues that the social responsibility of 
a corporation is simply to maximize their profit and provide return for the shareholdersii.
He pulls out multiple arguments to defend his stance and his first central argument 
begins by asking what social responsibility means and for whom. The answer lies within 
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the manager or corporate executive (CEO). A corporate executive is the primary 
employee to the owners of a business- the shareholders. The corporate executive has a 
direct responsibility to the shareholders, which includes conducting business in a manner 
that accords with shareholder desires. According to Friedman, these desires are generally 
to make as much money as possible for the company while conforming to the basic legal 
and moral rules of society. When the CEO takes on this role, they can be seen as an agent 
to the shareholder. Being an agent to the shareholder means the executive has established 
a voluntary contract (i.e.: some type of terms of agreement both parties adhere to) in 
which he is obliged to fulfill the desires of the shareholder. Yet Friedman is making 
implicit assumptions in saying these claims are true so I will try to interpret his argument 
in order to understand his ideas. Friedman says for the CEO to be an agent, a voluntary 
and contractual agreement must be set in place. This contract can be inferred to mean a 
promise that is being made between the shareholder and the corporate executive. It is this 
promise that creates a fiduciary duty for the CEO to act in accordance with shareholder 
desires. Since a promise is generally not to be broken, this creates a close alliance 
between the CEO and the shareholder in how the corporation will be run. At this point, 
Friedman includes that the CEO is in fact his own person outside of work and that he 
may have other, personal “social responsibilities” such as friends, family, his city, etc.iii. 
Yet Friedman asserts that these are according to the CEO’s own principals on an 
individual level and should not blend into the corporation in which he works as an agent. 
Friedman reasons for this by saying that outside of work, the CEO can spend his own 
money, which allows him to not act as an agent during these transactions. Therefore, 
these “social responsibilities” can be seen as personal or individual social responsibilities 
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rather than corporate social responsibility. So, through a promise, the CEO is bound to 
fulfill the desires of the shareholder in conducting business. 
 Another significant argument that Friedman makes relates to the financial 
distribution of a corporation’s money. He argues if the CEO spends shareholder money in 
a way that is considered to be socially responsible, he is in essence unfairly imposing 
taxes and deciding where tax proceeds go. If a corporative executive were to act in a 
socially responsible manner, it would mean he is acting in a way that is not in the interest 
of the shareholders, which violates the promise. For example, he may wish to refrain 
from increasing the price of a product in order to help fight the social issue of inflation2; 
this action of social responsibility, while perhaps morally good, is hurting the corporation 
by preventing it from increasing profits in order to further social objectives. Friedman 
argues that when the CEO spends the shareholder’s money in order to help general social 
interest, he is reducing the returns to the shareholders and unnecessarily spending money 
that hurts the business.  
When this happens, two questions are raised: First, Friedman examines the 
implications of political principle. As mentioned previously, when the executive unfairly 
spends someone else’s money, he is essentially imposing taxes and determining the 
expenditures of these taxes. However, this can be seen as unfairly imposing on 
governmental functions. The government is a highly complex and established system that 
carefully regulates and monitors society in such a way that is supposed to assure that 
taxes match (as much as possible) the desires of the public. But, when the executive 
decides to act socially responsible and combat problems of social justice, he becomes 
2 In economics, inflation is a sustained increase in the general price level of goods and services in an economy over a 
period of time. During periods of inflation, people lose confidence in money since the value of savings is reduced. 
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somewhat of a public employee, blindly trying to take on the role of the government, 
which he has no right to do since he is a businessman3. In regards to what political 
principle stands for, it is intolerable that a businessman should attempt to govern society 
without being elected to do so.  
The second implication Friedman addresses is in regards to consequences. He 
argues that it may not even be feasible for the executive to successfully get away with 
spending the stockholder’s money and if he does, it would always be questionable on 
how to rightfully spend it. Again, Friedman uses the example of the executive trying to 
fight inflation. It would certainly seem that a properly trained businessman would have 
no skill in combating such a complex issue. In addition, there would be serious 
consequences for the CEO, were he to get caught in unjustly spending the shareholder’s 
money. It is not unlikely that he would be fired since his actions no longer acted in 
accordance with the desires of the shareholders. 
Friedman’s article makes clear the difficulty of exercising social responsibility 
since it distracts corporations from their sole purpose. He asserts that corporations do not 
know how to properly invest in social causes and therefore, it should be left to the 
individual rather than the corporation. He is not saying that acting altruistically is wrong; 
he is merely suggesting that if one wishes to do so, he must do it on his own time and not 
at the expense of the corporation. Thus, he concludes by saying, “there is one and only 
social responsibility of a business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud”iv . 
3 A businessman (or woman) is someone who works in business or commerce, especially at an executive. This is 
different from a government official who works to serve the general public. 
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 The next section will focus on one of Friedman’s primary objector’s, Christopher 
Stone. A note to remember is that Stone merely gives objections to Friedman’s ideas and 
does not contribute a positive alternative to the shareholder theory. 
 
II. Christopher Stone and Objections to Shareholder Theory  
Now that we have an understanding of Milton Friedman and his ideas, we can 
examine Christopher Stone and his criticisms against Friedman. In understanding 
Friedman, I broke his work down into what I found to be two primary arguments- one in 
regards to a promise, and one in regards to how the CEO spends a company’s finances. 
Yet Friedman’s argument is complex and contains many components to it. While I 
merely showed two arguments, Stone outlines four key criticisms to Friedman in his 
paper entitled, “Why Shouldn’t Corporations be Socially Responsible?” The arguments 
he criticizes are the promissory argument, the agency argument, the role argument, and 
the polestar argument. Each one will be explained in how they supposedly weaken the 
ideas of shareholder theory. 
 
A. The Promissory Argument: The promissory argument can be seen as the most 
commonly held argument to oppose corporate social responsibility and is one of the 
arguments I explained in the Friedman section. The argument poses a moral claim that 
there is a promise made between a corporation and its shareholders. In essence, it states 
that those in a managerial position (the CEO’s) at a corporation have an obligation to the 
shareholders to act in accordance with what the shareholders desire since the shareholders 
are the investors in the company. This obligation can be seen as a promise between 
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executives and shareholders in that the executives have promised the shareholders to 
maximize profits for the corporation. 
 Stone challenges this argument first by pointing out that often times, the managers 
of a corporation simply do not get the opportunity to refuse a shareholder’s terms. In 
most cases, a shareholder almost never directly puts their money into a corporation at all. 
Rather, the shares have been issued in previous years and only through ‘hand me down’ 
types of investments do new shareholders claim their share. But, what happens during 
these inheritance types of transactions is that the obligations between the shareholders 
and the managers are never restated or made clear and thus, the CEO becomes obligated 
to a shareholder without necessarily given fair chance to refute. This can create a moral 
dilemma based on a “supposed promise”v.  
Next, Stone challenges the promissory argument by demonstrating why promises 
can be overridden. He claims, “Sometimes it is deemed morally justified to break 
promises in the furtherance of other social interests of higher concern”vi. There is nothing 
in the form of a promise that should keep us tied to a regime in which management solely 
maximizes the income of shareholders. Stone gives a brief example to demonstrate this 
point: A student makes a promise to show up to class on time, but if someone appeared to 
be in immediate danger on the student’s way to class and the student was the only 
available person to help, it would typically be deemed morally acceptable to break the 
promise of being on time to class in order to save a human life. So, even if a manager had 
made a promise to the shareholders that aims to maximize profits, Stone lays out two 
reasons for why it is permissible to break the promise. A) The promise to maximize 
profits does not necessarily mean maximize profits in every way possible that one can get 
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away with4. Meaning, even if it is legal to dump waste into a river, most people would 
agree that it is okay to break a promise that would cause serious harm like that. It would 
be okay to break a promise if the promise challenges basic moral principles. B) A 
promise that has been made can be broken in cases of morality.  
 Chapter two will expand on the promissory argument in more depth. 
 
B. The Agency Argument: Though related to the promissory argument, the agency  
argument is based upon agency principles. Whereas the promissory argument was 
founded in the inherent promise between management and shareholders, the agency 
argument rests upon the idea that shareholders deem the CEO’s as their primary moral 
agents. This means that the CEO should consider themselves more a moral agent to the 
shareholders than to any other stakeholder in a business. Friedman is a supporter of this 
idea saying that, “the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the 
corporation…”vii.  
 Stone criticizes Friedman’s claim by saying that this is wrong in accordance with 
the state of the law, and he is wrong to assume facts of corporate life 5. Taking a Kantian 
perspective, Stone argues that managers should not be viewed as mere agents to a 
shareholder. It is morally wrong to treat people as a mere means and using someone as an 
agent in order to maximize profits for a corporation is doing just that. Stone writes that 
Friedman sees the directors of a corporation as morally obligated in considering 
themselves an agent to the shareholders, but Stone believes this is incorrect. It is 
4 It is important to remember that businesses need to follow a basic moral code of conduct that is generally accepted by 
society; they are not exempt from all moral and ethical rules. 
5 The CEO’s should not consider themselves mere agents of the shareholders; also, it may be more likely that in 
corporations, the shareholders do not select the CEO’s. 
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inherently wrong for shareholders to consider management an agent to them, and it is 
also wrong for management to consider themselves more of an agent to the shareholders 
than to any other stakeholder in the corporation (i.e.: customers, suppliers, the state, etc.).  
 Stone also points out the agency argument lacks a strong conclusion; if a CEO 
truly considers themselves an agent of the shareholders, they should be able to express 
any interest they have in determining how their shareholder’s want them to act and then 
act accordinglyviii. In other words, if the CEO is considered an agent to shareholder, they 
should be able to express their thoughts on what the shareholders want them to do. This is 
not an unreasonable request seeing as the CEO’s are those who are supposed to fill the 
desires of the shareholders.  
 
C. The Role Argument: The role argument is slightly difficult to understand if not 
previously familiar with it. Therefore, I will briefly outline it before continuing on to 
Stone’s ideas. Throughout life, everyone has various obligations that need to be fulfilled. 
Sometimes these obligations are fulfilled through a promise that was contracted through a 
voluntary agreement. Other times however, we are tied to necessary obligations simply 
because we occupy a certain role regardless of a promise. For example, when one 
becomes a parent, they have necessary obligations to fulfill to their child simply because 
they play the role of the parent and not because they have made any explicit promises. It 
is their role as a parent that makes them obliged to raise their child, not a promise. In 
business, the role argument is based upon supposed considerations of the role of 
management. From Friedman’s perspective this means that sometimes the CEO’s have 
never explicitly promised to work in accordance with the desires of the shareholders, nor 
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did the shareholders actually designate the managers to assume the position of agents. 
Rather, the CEO is obliged to uphold the desires of the shareholders simply because their 
role as a manger signifies an assumed position that people take on without any specific 
verbal promise.   
 Stone challenges this argument by claiming that the CEO’s never actually 
promised the shareholders they would maximize the shareholder’s investment. Similarly, 
the shareholder’s never directly appointed the CEO’s to act as an agent in fulfilling this 
supposed role obligation. These roles have all been assumed rather than clearly 
expressed, which means it may not actually be the case that the shareholder’s sole desire 
is to maximize profits, or that the CEO should automatically be treated as an agent to the 
shareholders. Stone argues that the role argument suffers from the problem that the 
strongest moral obligations have only prima facie force behind it6. It is not acceptable for 
moral obligations only to be supported by prima facie force because it is not apparent 
why such obligations should take priority over contrary social obligations that could be 
advanced. In essence, a person can have other obligations besides the supposed one to the 
shareholders of a business and the role argument does not take this into consideration. 
These other non-corporate obligations may even be stronger than the corporate 
obligations, which is why it is unacceptable to assume the corporate obligations based on 
a supposed role. 
 
D. The Polestar Argument: The fourth argument that opposes corporate social  
6 Things that are considered prima facie are things that can be accepted as true until proven otherwise. In other words, 
they are based on first impressions or should be believed until there is contrary evidence to show why it should no 
longer be accepted. 
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responsibility is the polestar argument, which simply says that if the manager’s act in a 
fashion that aims to maximize profits, then it will be best for all. In other words, if the 
CEO’s act as though they had promised the shareholders they would do so, it would be 
the most beneficial for the corporation. This argument appeals to the interests of the 
shareholders since it is not based on supposed justified obligations. Rather, it is a means 
of acting in a direct manner toward what is best for the society as a whole. The argument 
takes an implicit favoritism towards those whose feel that moral judgments are 
particularly unimportant if they are not able to adapt to rational discussion. With this 
position, profits are preferable since they are able to provide a tangible standard of 
measure of success and failures in an efficient manner. What Stone challenges in this 
argument is that those in favor of CSR do not pursue other alternatives such as improving 
laws. Stone claims that the “antis”7 are blind to the fact that there are circumstances in 
which the law is not competent in keeping the corporations under control. The law ought 
to keep corporations under control since they do not know how to responsibly engage in 
civic action. Thus it is important to identify where the conventional forces are no longer 
sufficient in order to design and implement new measures of law to keep corporate 
conduct under control.  
  
Next, the chapter outlines Edward Freeman and his ideas in regards to the other 
competing CSR idea, the stakeholder theory. 
 
 
7 Those in favor of the shareholder theory. 
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III. R. Edward Freeman and the Stakeholder Theory 
Opposite to the shareholder theory, proponents of the stakeholder theory support 
providing for the discretionary expectations of society. In addition to making a profit and 
obeying the law, a company should aim to alleviate social issues. In his essay, “The 
Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation”, Edward Freeman challenges Friedman 
and the shareholder theory by proposing a framework of managerial capitalism that he 
feels is a stronger alternative than solely seeking to maximize profits. Freeman created 
the stakeholder theory to transform the structure of the modern corporation by replacing 
the concept that managers have a duty solely to shareholders with the concept that the 
CEO’s bear a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders. “Stakeholders are those groups who 
have a stake or claim on the firm…”ix and thus should be considered to what expense the 
firm should be managed. The stakeholder theory presents two key arguments that attempt 
to answer this question.  
 Before looking at the arguments, the concept of what a stakeholder is needs to be 
made clear. The types of stakeholders that Freeman focuses on are: owners, management, 
local community, customers, employees, and suppliersx. The owners are the shareholders 
and have financial stake in the corporation; they are the stockholders and their stake 
typically comes in the form of stocks, bonds, etc. As an owner, they expect some 
financial return or at least an effort to maximize shareholder value. Employees have their 
jobs and also their livelihood at stake8; to use employees simply as a means to end would 
be to not provide them with the proper support that is necessary. Suppliers hold stake in a 
firm since they provide the materials necessary to produce a product. Without the role of 
8 In return for their labor, employees typically expect security, wages, benefits, and meaningful work. In return for their 
loyalty, the corporation is expected to provide for the employees. 
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the suppliers, the business would have no way of making profits. To value the supplier as 
a valued member, rather than a means to get materials, the supplier will oblige to the firm 
when they are needed in the future. Essentially, it is about establishing a trusting and 
loyal relationship between the suppliers and the firm. Customers exchange resources for 
the products of the firm and in return receive the benefits of the products; in a sense, they 
pay for the development of new products. By paying attention to what the customer 
wants and establishing a strong relationship with the customers, the firm is able to 
address the needs of the suppliers and owners. In addition, caring for the customers will 
lead to positive thoughts about the company from the community. The local community 
claims stake in the business since they are allowing the business to be run in their area. 
The community benefits economically from the business and so the corporation has an 
obligation to the community to treat it respectfully and not subject it to unreasonable 
hazards such as toxic waste, pollution, etc.  
Freeman’s first key argument bears a Kantian perspective that tells us treat people 
as ends rather than just as a mere means. What all of these stakeholders have in common 
in relation to the corporation is that the corporation needs to value each stakeholder as an 
end that is essential to the survival of the business. To treat someone as an end means to 
see him or her as worthy of inherent value. If a person is not valued for their inherent 
worth, they are merely being used as means to end, which his morally impermissible. 
There are no exceptions to treating someone as a means rather than an end so it is 
important to understand the value of each human being in order to treat them in a morally 
acceptable manner. For the stakeholder’s, this means their contributions to the company 
are to be valued as something more than an instrument in helping company run 
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effectively. Rather, the corporation should know that their success is due to the 
contributions of the stakeholders and should appreciate them with a sense of inherent 
value.  
The second primary argument appeals to ideas of justice and fairness. It examines 
the way a corporation ought to be governed and to whom the managers should be 
responsible for9. The argument is posed around a central question of whether business 
actions are purely transactional or if they mean something more: sometimes there 
instances in business that are simply pure transactions. These occur when the terms of a 
deal are made explicit and when both parties voluntary agree to those terms. For example, 
when I go to the local ice cream shop, I am engaging in a pure and simple business 
transaction by handing the employer $2.00 for my ice cream since that is the set price. 
Yet there are other instances in which business operations may not be purely 
transactional. For instance, when looking at a whole society there are numerous other 
factors to consider in what rights a corporation has in conducting business.  Freeman 
argues that a corporation should be governed more in accordance with the way society is 
governed rather than simply making pure transactions between buyers and sellersxi. In a 
just society, it is necessary for businesses to be managed in such a way that benefits 
everyone. Not only does this mean benefit the various stakeholders in a company, but 
also benefit the public. Since businesses have such a monumental impact and influence 
on society, it would be seen as unreasonable to not have expectations of them in regards 
to how they treat society. These corporations ought to bear a moral obligation to help 
society in regards to this impact by ‘giving back’ in a way that furthers society. The 
9 Also known as, “The Legal Argument”. 
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corporations should be regulated according to the rules of justice that govern society 
since being pervasive in society creates an influence that is more significant than treating 
business transactions as purely individual. So, it is important to allow for the governing 
of corporations to work with society in a way that benefits them. 
Freeman shows how the stakeholder argument can be implemented to help solve 
the problems of how to manage people fairly and also, how to determine a firm’s moral 
obligations in looking beyond maximizing profits. 
 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the key positions in the 
corporate social responsibility debate. The shareholder theory provides an argument for 
maximizing profits for a corporation while the stakeholder theory aims to show why 
corporations should focus more attention on the other stakeholders involved in a 
business. Stone then challenges the shareholder theory by criticizing what he feels are 
four the key arguments it rests on.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 Criticisms of the Promissory Argument 
 
 Friedman analyzes the relationship between the corporate executives and the 
shareholder’s to explain why acting socially responsible is not the prominent goal in 
running a business10. To clarify, the corporate executive is someone who acts as the 
highest level manager (the CEO) in executing the organizations strategy, policy, and 
daily operations. On the other hand, the shareholders are those who have invested stock 
into the business- they are the owners. So, to determine how social responsibility should 
be factored in to a business, one should consider what it would mean and for whom.  
Businesses have a specific structure in which they are designed in order to make things 
run efficiently; there are many stakeholders that play a role in making the business 
operate the way it needs to. But, Friedman argues that the relationship between the 
corporate executives and the shareholders is what is most important in determining what 
ways the business should act.  
One of the ways in which Friedman defends his position that corporations should 
seek to increase profits is through the argument that highlights the importance of a 
promise. This argument, known as the promissory argument is based upon a moral claim 
that the corporate executives have an obligation to keep their promise to the 
shareholdersxii. In a free-enterprise system, a corporate executive is an employee to the 
shareholders of the business. Since the CEO is an employee to the shareholders, she is 
obligated to fulfill the desires of the shareholders. Generally speaking, the principal 
10 Recall that Friedman believes the primary goal of a business is to maximize shareholder value while staying within 
the legal and moral bounds of society.  
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objective of the shareholder is to increase profits in a way that conforms to the basic rules 
of society. Since the CEO has promised the shareholder to fulfill their desires for the 
business, this means she will generally work towards increasing profits in a way that is 
socially and morally permissible. The promise should be upheld since the executives 
presumably entered their position by way of voluntary contract. This means that they 
were fully cognizant of their actions, what their responsibilities entail, whom they report 
to, what their managerial duties are, etc.11. In essence, a contract is a written promise. 
When the executive voluntarily agrees to the contract, it can be seen as willingly 
accepting responsibility to act in accordance with the promise. While Friedman argues in 
favor of the promissory argument, Christopher Stone argues against him in order to show 
why corporations should in fact, act in a socially responsible manner. Though briefly 
outlined in the previous chapter, it is necessary to go deeper into Stone’s reasoning in 
order to challenge Friedman’s assertions. 
 
I. The ‘Hand Me Down’ Investments 
 Stone first criticizes Friedman by arguing that the CEO is often times never 
offered the chance to deny the terms of the shareholder. In a basic promise agreement, 
there is a direct and honest communication about what terms are being agreed to and how 
they ought to be upheld. When the terms are explicitly communicated, agreed to, and 
then violated, the promise has been broken. So if the CEO promised the shareholders that 
she would aim to maximize profits (per their desires), doing otherwise would negate the 
promise. However, in American businesses, Stone claims it is rare that the shareholders 
11 A contract is a written or spoken agreement, typically concerning employment, which is enforceable by law. 
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put their money into a corporation upon the sole agreement that the company would be 
run so as to maximize returns. In fact, shareholders almost never directly put their money 
into a corporation at allxiii. What typically occurs is that shareholders come into an 
investment opportunity through prior shareholders and then ownership is given through a 
‘hand me down’ type of investments12. Stone argues that a promise cannot be treated in 
such a way. When promises are made, they cannot simply be traded away at a person’s 
disposal. Typically when two people make a promise together, they have the opportunity 
to change the terms of agreement; but if the promise has been handed off, the terms 
cannot be changed since the new person fulfilling the promise is not the original promise 
maker who helped create the terms. Therefore, they do not have the power to change the 
initial terms. 
In a business environment, Stone would argue the same principles apply. Imagine 
at the start of company, all the shareholders who invest in the company are on board with 
the agreements they are making at the time of investment. Assume this agreement is in 
accordance with shareholder theory. Since most businesses were founded years ago, we 
can deduce that over time, new investors have come in seeking to buy stock and 
ultimately purchase stock from a previous shareholder and thus, the stock has then 
essentially been traded off. However, the passing of stock should not be allowed since 
there were promises bound to the investment and Stone believes that promises cannot be 
handed off. Also when this occurs, it means the terms of agreement are not being 
repurposed in any sense. The original shareholders worked with the CEO to create the 
12 What does a ‘hand me down’ promise or investment mean? Say two ordinary people make a promise to meet for 
dinner on a given date. In order for these two people to be bound by this promise, they have come up with terms that 
they both voluntarily agree to uphold. When this promise is made, Stone argues that it cannot then be handed down or 
passed off. So if person A decides she no longer wants to attend the dinner, she cannot simply hand off her obligation 
to a friend to take her place. This is because the friend was not present in making the promise.  
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terms of agreement that were to be obliged, and if either party wanted to change the 
terms, they had the opportunity to do so since both parties are the original ‘contract-
makers’. If the original shareholder handed down his stock and promise to a new 
shareholder, he is creating new terms for the CEO that cannot be renegotiated. During 
these transactions, the obligations that were initially agreed upon are never restated or 
explicitly agreed upon. When this occurs, the corporate executive is never offered a fair 
chance to refute the obligations. 
 This criticism attacks Friedman by saying that these supposed promises between 
the CEO and the shareholder are unjustified due to the means in which their relationship 
was bound by. Stone identifies a clear point in the argument where Friedman’s argument 
can potentially be undermined- that it is morally unacceptable for promises to be handed 
off. Yet Friedman would see Stone’s argument as unconvincing. In looking at Friedman’s 
original argument, his only claims are in regards to what the current promise between the 
CEO and the shareholder should or should not be. Considering the guidelines of a 
promise or voluntary contract, he merely focuses on upholding the promise. He does not 
delve into how the current promise was conceived or if the means by which the promise 
reached the current shareholders was morally acceptable or not. Thus, Friedman may 
deem Stone’s argument irrelevant. Stone fails to address whether a promise that has been 
handed off should be fulfilled or not. Though we can likely guess what Stone’s answer 
would be13, Friedman may argue that even if a promise was immorally handed down, it 
still ought to be fulfilled since it is a promise between the CEO and the shareholder 
nonetheless. From learning about the promissory argument, it is evident how much 
13 I would take Stone’s answer to follow the lines of: Since handed promises are morally unacceptable, it is 
also morally unacceptable for them to be fulfilled since it would be occurring on immoral grounds. 
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significance Friedman places on upholding a promise. When that promise aims to 
maximize profits for the shareholders and the corporation, it should to be fulfilled 
regardless of whether the promise was handed off or not.14 
 
 II. Overriding Promises  
 Stone continues to criticize the promissory argument by arguing that the first 
significant implication of a supposed promise running from management to the 
shareholders is that it is sometimes morally acceptable to break a promise if it benefits 
social interests of greater significancexiv. As discussed earlier, the example that Stone 
gives is a student who promises to arrive to class on time but when he sees a man 
drowning on his way to class, it is deemed morally acceptable to break the promise in 
order to save a life. Stone attacks the promissory argument by saying that even if the 
CEO had made an express promise to the shareholders it should not be taken to mean 
maximize profits at all costsxv. Rather, it implies that if the promise lies within reasonable 
limits then the promise should be upheld, but if a moral issue of greater significance is 
presented to a corporation, the executives can morally justify breaking the promise in 
order to promote a social good. Considering most people agree with the idea that a 
blanket promise can be broken in select cases, Friedman’s argument is weakened. 
14Another response Friedman may give highlights the section in which Stone discusses the ‘hand me down’ type of 
investments. This occurs when an interested investor becomes a shareholder without restating the objectives. Investing 
in a company to become owner or part-owner is a large business opportunity that is to be taken seriously. That being 
said, those who are looking to invest in a business ought to research the companies they are interested in. In researching 
the companies, they would be able to find out the goals and desires of the previous shareholders. It seems unlikely that 
an individual would want to become a shareholder in a company that does not align with their beliefs or desires. So, in 
deciding which company to invest in, the potential investor will most likely choose the one that aligns with their goals. 
If an investor is looking for a company that engage in CSR, then they will likely not invest in a company that does not 
support this objective. However, if the investor is interested in a company that seeks to maximize profits and finds one 
that aligns with this desire, then he is likely to become a shareholder. Friedman may argue that it is unnecessary to 
restate the shareholder’s objectives for a corporation since presumably they are investing in something they already 
know aligns with what they want. Yet, this does not align with the promissory argument and instead seems to favor the 
idea that the new shareholders are simply agreeing to the terms their predecessors constituted.    
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 Not only would it seem unreasonable to not break a promise that helps the greater 
good, it would seem morally incorrect. Yet, Friedman is not an evil person; he does 
believe in engaging in socially responsible acts to further society so long as it occurs 
within an individual’s principles rather than through the corporate promises. The CEO of 
a company is considered an agent to the shareholder while business is being conducted. 
However, the CEO is her own person outside of the corporate workplace and can make 
promises according to her own individual principles- in regards to social responsibility or 
not- that can be acted upon when she is not upholding the desires of the shareholders. 
Since Friedman values the concept of a promise with such high regard, it does not seem 
implausible that he would agree with Stone that in some instances, a blanket promise 
could be broken. I feel that his difference of opinion from Stone in when a promise can 
be broken is where the promise lies. Friedman would say that it is wrong to break a 
promise between the shareholder and the CEO, but the CEO may be able to break a 
promise she has made according to her individual principles. For example, if one of these 
individually held promises suggested leaving the company because she felt an issue of 
greater moral significance was occurring, the action could be morally justified since it 
aligns with her personal principles. Nevertheless, when the CEO is acting as an agent to 
the shareholders, she cannot break her promise to them since she is actively fulfilling her 
role as CEO. Only if another promise made on the account of the CEO’s individual 
principles needed to be acted on, could she perhaps morally justify breaking her promise 
to the shareholder in a particular situation.  
Stone may not accept this as an adequate refutation to his original criticism. Why 
is it morally acceptable to break a promise made on one’s individual principles but not 
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morally acceptable to break a promise between an agent and the shareholder? A promise 
is a promise and thus, the relationship between which parties the promise was contracted 
under should not influence whether it can or cannot be broken. If a situation arises that 
would violate a promise but that is clearly of greater moral significance, then it should be 
acceptable to break this promise. If the situation is not worthy of breaking the promise, 
then the promise does not need to be broken. Another point worth considering is that 
some promises may only be capable of being upheld when in the position of CEO. For 
example, perhaps the CEO of a major corporation wants to increase wages for her 
employees to give them a more satisfying work experience. While Friedman says 
fulfilling acts of social good may be accomplished on individual time, it would be rather 
difficult for the CEO to fulfill such an obligation based on those individual principles. 
She as a private citizen does not likely have enough influence or power to change an 
issue like that. In her position as CEO she presumably has all the necessary resources at 
her disposal to help the situation. With this in mind, Stone’s main idea is that a promise 
should or should not be broken based on the event in question. 
 However, Friedman may disagree further with Stone on this point and argue that 
it is to whom the promise is directed toward that is of significance rather than the context. 
A promise created by an individual based on her personal ideals that she chooses to 
uphold on account of her individual and moral well-being can be broken before a promise 
between two separate individuals- especially when the two parties bear a professional 
relationship and when monetary transactions are involved. This is because a professional 
relationship in the work environment bears external responsibilities. A promise made 
between a CEO and the shareholders not only concern themselves, it concerns the other 
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stakeholders in the business, the overall success of the business, the public, and more. 
Also, when a promise is partially bound through money, more is at stake for the parties 
involved. If a CEO breaks a promise to the shareholder, the shareholder loses money on 
their investment, in turn hurting the business and losing profits. On the other hand, 
looking at a promise that an individual makes to herself, the implications of breaking that 
promise causes significantly less impact since there are no external parties involved. 
Individual promises are typically made in order to better oneself in a moral sense, and 
breaking that promise in order to fulfill something of even greater moral worth causes 
little to no harm for the individual. In a business setting, the moral significance of 
breaking a promise between the shareholder and CEO is not great enough in relation to 
the other factors involved to be deemed worthy of being broken. 
 It is certainly difficult to weigh the moral significance of various promises and 
obligations. Perhaps it may even seem unfair to compare the value of moral obligations- 
after all, each one holds a particular level of significance otherwise they would not be 
considered a moral obligation. So it is important to distinguish why the obligations a 
CEO might experience other than their promise to the shareholders are less demanding 
and hence, should not be overridden. In a typical American business, many of the 
competing moral obligations that arise are those that include acting socially responsible. 
Aside from highly unlikely and rare events, many of the obligations would include acts 
that promote some social justice, i.e. saving an endangered animal species or raising 
employee wages. These issues are certainly important and should not be ignored, yet it is 
simply not the CEO’s responsibility to worry about such issues when their responsibility 
is to the shareholder. It is fulfilling their role as CEO that makes their promise to the 
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shareholder of greater moral importance than furthering a social good their business may 
have no connection to. For example, when a person steps in the role of the parent by 
having child, it is highly unlikely that an event would occur that would cause them to step 
out of their parental role in order to help a different cause. I do not want to undermine the 
importance of acts that promote social welfare, but in determining the value of competing 
moral obligations, the promise the CEO made to the shareholder will hold more strength 
due to the relationship and the role between the CEO and the shareholder. 
 
III. Multiple Conflicting Promises  
 Finally, the second implication Stone suggests is that the promise made between 
the shareholders and the corporate executives may not be one that is committed solely to 
maximizing profits of the firmxvi. The existing shareholders are the owners of the 
corporation; they are the ones who invest their own money into a company and therefore, 
they create the obligations that the executives need to withhold. If the shareholders decide 
that their primary aim is not to increase profits by any means possible, then the promise 
between the shareholder and the CEO has changed. Friedman argues that since most 
shareholders’ chief motive is to maximize profits for the firm, then the promise of the 
executive would be to work towards that. But, to assume as a whole that all shareholders 
share this perspective is wrong according to Stone. When the multiple shareholders have 
different expectations and ideas for their company, the various actions required to keep a 
promise are different, thus creating an incompatibility that questions Friedman. This 
creates a unique dilemma for the CEO in determining which promise to uphold. 
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However, I will save philosophical analysis on this second implication for the following 
chapter where I use my reasoning to create an argument in favor of Friedman. 
 
Stone’s criticism of Friedman does not deny that a promise is in place. Rather, he 
criticizes the amount of significance that Friedman places on the promissory argument. 
Friedman’s conception of the promissory argument and his defense of it highlight two 
key points. First, that in most cases all shareholders have the goal of wanting to maximize 
profits while engaging in open and free competition without deception. The second key 
idea his argument rests on is that the promise between the shareholders and the corporate 
executive is one too strong break. If the CEO is an employee to the shareholder and has 
in fact entered into a voluntary contract, a steadfast promise has been formed in the mind 
of Friedman. But as Stone refutes Friedman, it is clear that there is more to consider in 
what constitutes a promise such as whom it affects, when it was made, how it will be 
executed etc.  
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Chapter 3 
 
So What Does This All Mean? 
 
As addressed in chapter two, Stone makes light of multiple implications against 
the promissory argument that Friedman continually emphasizes. I would like to explore 
the implication concerning multiple conflicting promises further- to ultimately argue my 
final position on this topic- that Milton Friedman’s conception of corporate social 
responsibility is correct in assuming that the overall aim of a business or a corporation 
should be to maximize profits so long as it is regulated within a legal and moral 
framework. It should be noted that simply exploring one implication or objection will not 
fully defend Friedman’s entire thesis. To do so, defenses against the numerous objections 
posed against his ideas would need to be covered. I will however defend what I consider 
to be the strongest implication to show why this one objection can help make Friedman’s 
thesis more defensible all around. 
 
I. Incompatible Promises 
To recall, the promissory argument relies on a moral claim that is based on the 
supposed obligation that the corporate executives have to the shareholder’s. While Stone 
gives numerous reasons to object to this argument, the implication this chapter will 
explore is his second implication. This objection states that even when an unbreakable 
promise is in place between the corporate executive and the shareholders, there is no 
certainty in what that promise may contain. Since the shareholders are the owners of the 
company by way of investment, they set their promises in place based on the expectations 
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they have for the company. However, it is important to remember that there are many 
shareholders in a business. When numerous people invest in a business, it is seemingly 
inevitable that conflict or incompatibility amongst viewpoints may arise. Each 
shareholder may want different outcomes for the company, which leaves the CEO in a 
position of difficulty. These conflicting perspectives create an interesting philosophical 
dilemma between Friedman and Stone in regards to the promissory argument.  
To understand the dilemma in a more comprehensive manner, it is essential to 
outline it in full detail. First, it is natural to assume that within a corporation there are 
multiple shareholders. As previously mentioned, these shareholders collectively can be 
considered the owners of a business since they all invest some portion of their money into 
it. Individually, each shareholder would be considered a part owner in the business, with 
their share of ownership correlating to the percentage of shares they choose to invest in. 
As the owners of a business, the shareholders hold the position to express their desires for 
the company. However, it is quite plausible that each shareholder (or many of them) will 
seek different overall objectives for the company. When looking at the promissory 
argument, the corporate executives enter into a promise with the shareholders that 
morally bind them to uphold such wishes. If we adopt Friedman’s outlook and hold that 
this promise is indissoluble, then the CEO is faced with the daunting task of obliging 
each shareholder’s desire. According to Stone, it may not be the case that every 
shareholder shares the same desire to maximize profits for the companyxvii. It may be that 
some of the shareholders primary desire for the company is to act in a socially 
responsible manner. For example, they may feel that each employee deserves a higher 
salary than is required as the minimum since they believe in treating their employees as 
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ends rather than mere means. In this instance then, the promise between the executive and 
the shareholder would be to maintain the effort of keeping higher wages for employees. 
This of course, is no longer in accordance with the aim to maximize profits. So, the 
corporate executive is now in a troublesome position. She agrees with the idea that there 
is a promise that runs between the shareholders and the executives. She also agrees that 
working to uphold this promise and keep the shareholders satisfied is a reasonable part of 
her job. But, how is she to keep each shareholder satisfied when they have contradictory 
ideas of what promise is the one to be upheld? 
 
II. Assuming the Overall Goal should be To Maximize Profits  
 
When a corporate executive is trying to decide which promise to uphold, I argue 
that the executive should take Friedman’s side and work to fulfill the promise that seeks 
to increase profits for the company while staying within legal and moral limits. There are 
a few things to consider when making this point.  
Businesses run in efforts to stimulate the economy by providing jobs and 
increasing consumerism15. Empirically speaking, to keep a business running, it is 
necessary for profits to consistently flow into the company otherwise the business will 
fail. In other words, companies must retain profitability or they will go out of business. 
Since increasing profits is necessary to keep the business going, then it would be 
irrational to not act in such a manner that aims to maximize those profits. A business can 
certainly sustain on consistent profits, yet it may be more beneficial for them to aim for 
increasing profits in order to keep a competitive edge. Newer businesses pose a potential 
15 Businesses contribute to society by making a profit, which supports employment, wages, purchases, investments, and 
taxes. Conducting business as usual is sufficient social benefit. 
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threat based on the assumption that newer businesses will perform better. With this in 
mind, it seems that if businesses were to act in a socially responsible manner- by either 
contributing to the public good or doing internal work for the company- the amount of 
overall profit will be lowered since they will only be keeping profits steady rather than 
increasing.  
However, contrary to this claim, empirical studies in the field of ethical business 
practices have been conducted to show that when companies act in a socially responsible 
manner, it can be more beneficial. In their study, “Corporate Social Performance and 
Firm Risk: A Meta-Analytic Review”, Marc Orlitzky and John Benjamin show that the 
more a firm engages in corporate social responsibility, the lower its financial riskxviii. 
Further, the better a firm’s CSR reputation, the lower its risk. “Thus, a firm that is 
socially responsible and responsive may be able to increase interpersonal trust…and 
therefore, ultimately reduce uncertainty about its financial performance”xix.  
Another study published in the International Journal of Management Reviews also 
supports social responsibilityxx . The business case for CSR refers to the arguments that 
provide rational justification for CSR initiatives from a financial and economic 
perspective. The research found that firms which engage in CSR activities will be 
rewarded by reaping economic and financial benefits. In yielding a broad perspective of 
the case, the socially responsibility initiatives can be justified due to the direct and 
indirect links affect corporate performancexxi. Engaging in CSR can enable a firm to 
enhance its competitive edge by fostering positive relationships with the various 
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stakeholders involved; it reduces financial risk to the company, and offers a more positive 
reputation for the company16. 
Though these findings show empirically that acting socially responsible may be 
beneficial for a firm, it should not undermine that maximizing profits can also be 
beneficial to the firm. While the studies shows that acting social responsible will help a 
company achieve success, they also does not say that not acting socially responsible will 
be detrimental to a company in achieving financial/economic success. If businesses do 
not dedicate their time to engaging in CSR, they can keep on a more direct path towards 
keeping the business successful. On the other hand, engaging in CSR is difficult to get 
right; if the CEO does not spend the money in the correct manner or if the decisions to 
engage in civic duty are made by ill-informed executives, there is a greater risk for 
failure. If this is true, a shareholder’s primary goal ought to be aimed at maximizing 
profits for the business since contains more safety in achieving success. Businesses help 
society run in a profitable and successful manner with continual progress towards the 
economy. In order to keep a business running, profits should be consistently coming in to 
the company.  
 Understanding the purpose and conception of a business helps distinguish why 
Friedman assumes that the overall goal of shareholders should still be to maximize 
profits. In a business environment, Friedman sees people as more narrowly self-interested 
in furthering their goals than what is typically considered beneficial. In most other 
aspects of life, people aim to achieve benefits that they deem worthwhile and not solely 
16 Empirical research fosters support through gathering statistical data whereas philosophical arguments are concerned 
on building a sound argument through reasoning. When considering this difference, the empirical evidence does not 
change the outcome of my philosophical argument. 
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based out of self-interest. Their goals should align with a moral code to make these 
benefits worthy. Yet Friedman sees business opportunities as primarily money oriented 
because that is how the businesses will achieve the most success. If we understand 
success in this context as aiming to increase overall profits for a company, then it is easy 
to see why Friedman assumes the CEO’s and shareholders should share the assumption 
that maximizing profits by not engaging in CSR is the right action to engage in. 
 
III. A Hybrid Utilitarian and Deontological Approach  
Now that is known why a shareholder and CEO should assume that maximizing 
profits is the overall goal, an argument can be made for why this takes priority when an 
executive is faced with conflicting shareholder desires. From what can be recalled earlier 
in the chapter, it is highly likely that the various shareholders of a company will hold 
conflicting ideas about what promises need to be fulfilled by the corporate executive. 
Some may want to maximize overall profits while others may wish to act in a more 
socially responsible manner. However, based on the argument conceived of why a 
shareholder ought to hold the desire of wanting to maximize profits, it seems that looking 
at a long-term perspective of morality and economic efficiency is where the answer lies 
in choosing which promise to uphold. In an immediate sense of wanting to engage in 
civic action or acting morally towards employees, the more moral promise for a corporate 
executive to uphold may seem that it would be the one that involves engaging in such 
actions.  This is effective due to the instant results that are produced. For example, raising 
the wage of employees will see an immediate result since the employees can utilize their 
extra earnings. But as argued earlier, when businesses engage in socially responsible 
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actions it may stall their efforts in increasing profits since they have a higher risk of 
‘ruining’ their well-intended actions, which would put them at a long-term economic 
disadvantage.  
Thus, when a corporate executive is trying to decide which shareholder’s desire to 
uphold, the corporate executive should take Friedman’s approach since it produces 
greater overall welfare. These ideas edge on a utilitarian perspective by keeping the 
promise that will maximize overall utility. In everyday life, people sometimes get 
themselves into conflicting promises. In each scenario, each person has a different way to 
deal with which promise they ultimately decide to uphold. Some people may think that 
the first promise made is the binding one since it was made first and therefore, holds the 
most significance. Others may make their decision based on what they feel the 
significance of each commitment weighs. In looking at what is at stake in each promise, 
some take a deontological approach while others take a utilitarian approach. Those in 
support of deontology would pick the promise that they feel upholds the value of each 
individual involved, and the utilitarian supports would choose the promise that will be of 
greater utility as a whole, potentially sacrificing individual value along the way. For the 
CEO’s to decide what promise to uphold they ought to look at which promise will 
achieve greater overall well-being as a whole. 
In this light, though aiming to achieve overall good may seem utilitarian, I will 
argue why it can also be seen as a deontological act. Since ideas of deontology typically 
explain why we ought to treat people as an ends rather than mere means, a similar 
comparison can be made in the case of corporations to the public. First, I will give a brief 
outline of Kant’s work to understand more comprehensively what it means to value 
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someone as an end rather than treating them as a mere means. In Kantian ethics, the 
fundamental value is treating humanity as an end in itself and it is necessary to follow in 
order to live life in good moral standing. Rational nature17 is described as an end in itself 
since it is self-sufficient, independent, and self -standing. In other words, it is an end in 
the sense of something for the sake of which we actxxii. It is important that every moral 
action fulfill an end as a long as it is a self-standing end and not for the sake of fulfilling 
other means. Kant then presents the following claim to show why humanity should be 
considered an end in itself. 
“The human being necessarily represents his own existence [as an end in itself]; 
thus to that extent [the formula of humanity] is a subjective principle of human actions. 
But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just 
the same rational ground as is valid also for me; thus it is at the same time an objective 
principle from which, as supreme practical ground, all laws of the will must be able to be 
derived.” (G 4:429)xxiii  
According to Allen Wood’s interpretation of Kant, it is reasonable to take this 
claim to mean that there is something in the way people act and think about their actions 
that commits them to being responsible for their own existence as an end in itself. These 
fundamental human actions are in relation to towards holding a certain attitude or sense 
of esteem that leads a person to act morally. A rational human should then, engage in 
morally responsible actions that will further the value of humanity as an end. For 
example, when I go to the market, I cannot value the checker as someone who is simply 
17 Rational nature is not an end; however, in another sense where Kant also thinks that every action must have an end. 
“Rational nature is not being thought of a state of affairs to be produced by action. Instead, an end in itself is something 
already existing whose value grounds even our pursuit of the ends produced by our actions. The notion that the word 
‘end’ may refer only to such a producible state of affairs is simply a philosophical error about the concept ‘end’. 
(Wood, 85) 
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there to help me ring up my groceries. Rather, I must value them for their humanity and 
their actions of good (in this case checking groceries) that contribute to their rational 
human value. Thus, in deontological practices, to treat someone or something as an end 
means to value them for their inherent worth. On the other hand, to treat someone as a 
means to an end entails using him or her as an instrument to get to the end goal. Using 
someone or something as a tool is not an action of moral worth.  
 To engage in corporate social responsibility then, a corporate executive is 
fulfilling the wish of a shareholder who aims to achieve some form of high status for the 
company. While it may seem like the actions are morally worthy, the company is actually 
treating the beneficiaries of socially responsible actions in a way that treats them as a 
means to an end. By failing to look at how maximizing profits will achieve moral value 
in a long-term perspective, immediate acts of social responsibility by corporations are 
merely utilizing their power in a way that is only temporarily good and thus, can be seen 
as treating people as a means rather than an end.  
So, when a corporate executive is faced with multiple desires to uphold, she 
should choose her promises by thinking in this process: Achieving increased levels of 
overall welfare is a good thing18. In order to do this, it is crucial to remember that 
fulfilling immediate obligations of social responsibility will only temporarily fix the 
problem. This is because the actions required to achieve this would involve treating 
people as a means to end, which is considered morally wrong. However, aiming to 
increase overall welfare can be achieved when the shareholder expresses a desire to 
maximize profits for the company. Though it may seem that the company is self-
18 ‘Good thing’ from a Utilitarian perspective since seeking to achieve greater overall welfare will lead to happiness. 
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interested, it is ultimately the more moral choice to pursue since it treats other parties 
involved as an end, rather than a mere means and this is considered morally good. Being 
seen as end in itself is positive since it highlights the inherent value in people. When a 
company works to maximize profits, it is looking in a long-term goal that treats people as 
an end by increasing overall good through economic efficiency and stability. This 
economic efficiency and stability is the end goal since it keeps people satisfied by 
keeping jobs available, consumerism in demand, etc., all of which achieve overall levels 
of satisfaction. This argument takes the initial approach to keeping a promise in a 
utilitarian perspective and blending it with deontological aspects to understand why 
ultimately looking at the overall good is in fact treating people as ends. 
 
Therefore, the obvious choice for the CEO is to uphold the promise that 
maximizes shareholder value. This sides with Friedman since it adopts his principles in 
regards to how a corporation should be run. Although Stone provides strong criticism 
against the promissory argument, the reasons presented show why Friedman’s 
perspective is the dominant one and is the one to be adopted. As mentioned previously, 
this is simply one objection that was explored in an attempt at defending Freidman’s 
thesis. In order to defend his entire thesis, a more in depth and rigorous analysis of all 
objections should be pursued. It was my aim in going into depth about the promissory 
argument and further, the implication of multiple conflicting promises, that if reasons to 
support Friedman’s thesis could be made through this objection, it would allow for 
stepping stone in later looking at the alternative objections. 
 
  38 
Concluding Remarks 
 Recall from the first chapter, the two major theories involved in the CSR debate. 
One theory favors Milton Friedman in that corporations should aim to maximize 
shareholder value. The other side favors Edward Freeman and his conception of the 
stakeholder theory that argues towards corporations acting engaging in socially 
responsible activities in order to value each stakeholder. From a broad perspective, the 
debate does not necessarily seem that complex; a CEO can merely pick which direction 
she wants to focus her business. But in breaking down shareholder theory and 
understanding its conception, it is evident that the debate presents a more complex and 
rigorous philosophical analysis that requires a thorough understanding of each side.  
 In following the shareholder theory and developing Friedman’s overall ideas, the 
promissory argument became the primary argument to explore due to the significance of 
a promise. Although Christopher Stone does not provide a positive alternative in 
criticizing Friedman, he presents a set of ideas that critically question the ethical nature of 
the promissory argument. A promise has multiple complex components to it, and looking 
at the relationship between each party, the context, the moral significance, etc. all 
contribute to the criticism that Stone presents for Friedman. Stone challenges Friedman 
by arguing that promises can be overridden, or that sometimes it is not okay to assume 
that a shareholder’s sole purpose is to increase profits for a firm. In defending Friedman, 
I responded to Stone’s criticisms by explaining the complexities in the promise that the 
CEO holds with the shareholders. 
 Finally, in looking to see how the promissory argument comes together, I created 
somewhat of a hybrid utilitarian- deontology argument to show how we should aim to 
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maximize overall welfare in order to not treat people as a means to end, since that is 
considered morally unacceptable. From an empirical perspective, engaging in CSR is not 
detrimental to corporation; it is even morally good in an immediate sense. But in 
blending two major ethical theories, a defense of the promissory argument in favor of 
Friedman comes to light. Though the promissory argument and its implications are only 
one aspect of Friedman’s overarching argument, finding a way to defend it lends itself to 
eventually defending the entire argument. 
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